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In this paper I propose and estimate an equilibrium search model
using matched employer-employee data to study the extent to which
wage di⁄erentials between men and women can be explained by dif-
ferences in productivity, disparities in friction patterns, segregation or
wage discrimination. The availability of matched employer-employee
data is essential to empirically disentangle di⁄erences in workers pro-
ductivity across groups from di⁄erences in wage policies toward those
groups. The model features rent splitting, on-the-job search and two-
sided heterogeneity in productivity. It is estimated using German
microdata. I ￿nd that female workers are less productive and more
mobile than males. Female workers have on average slightly lower bar-
gaining power than their male counterparts. The total gender wage
gap is 42 percent. It turns out that most of the gap, 65 percent, is
accounted for by di⁄erences in productivity, 17 percent of this gap is
driven by segregation while di⁄erences in destruction rates explain 9
percent of the total wage-gap. Netting out di⁄erences in o⁄er-arrival
rates would increase the gap by 13 percent. Due to di⁄erences in wage
setting, female workers receive wages 9 percent lower than male ones.
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11 Introduction
In this paper I propose and estimate an equilibrium search model using
matched employer-employee data to study the extent to which wage di⁄eren-
tials between men and women can be explained by di⁄erences in productiv-
ity, disparities in friction patterns, segregation or wage discrimination. The
model features rent-splitting, on-the-job search and two-sided heterogeneity
in productivity. The estimation involves several steps: ￿rstly, I estimate
group-speci￿c productivity from ￿rm-level production functions. Secondly, I
compute job-retention and job-￿nding rates using employee-level data. Fi-
nally, I calculate rent-splitting parameters (bargaining power) relying on indi-
vidual wage data, transition parameters and productivity measures estimated
in the previous stages.
There has been many studies focused on explaining how much of the
unconditional mean wage di⁄erential between groups may be understood as
wage discrimination1. The traditional approach takes the unexplained gap
in wage regressions as evidence of discrimination. This method involves es-
timating Mincer-type equations for both groups and then decomposing the
di⁄erence in mean wages into ￿explained￿and ￿unexplained￿components.
The fraction of the gap that cannot be explained by di⁄erences in observable
characteristics is considered to be discrimination. This kind of analysis has
been very informative from a descriptive perspective, but the causal inter-
pretation and the nature of discrimination are not clear.
Discrimination refers to di⁄erences in wages that are only caused by the
fact of belonging to a given group. Therefore causality is an essential issue in
this context. Ideally, detecting discrimination would require testing whether
the group e⁄ect is signi￿cant once we have controlled for between-groups
di⁄erences in wage determinants.
The availability of matched employer-employee data allowed Hellerstein
and Neumark (1999)2 to pioneer a new approach. Their method uses ￿rm
1See Blau and Kahn (2003) and Altonji and Blank (1999) for good surveys.
2The main papers in this branch are: Hellerstein and Neumark, (1999) with Israeli
data, Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske, (1999) with U.S. data, Verner (1999) using data
from Ghana, Crepon, Deniau and PØrez-Duarte (2002) with French data, Lopez-Acevedo
2level data to estimate relative marginal products of various worker types,
which are then compared with their relative wages. This analysis implies
a clear causality from productivity to wages. Whenever perfect competi-
tion holds in the labor market, productivity is the only wage determinant,
and therefore any di⁄erence in wages that is not driven by a di⁄erence in
productivity may be considered to be discrimination.
However, a frictionless scenario has been shown to be a little help in un-
derstanding the labor market. In a labor market with frictions, productivity
is not the only wage determinant, and therefore comparing wages and pro-
ductivity may provide an incomplete picture of the problem. Moreover, wage
di⁄erentials across groups are often accompanied by unemployment rate and
job duration di⁄erentials. There is a vast literature estimating di⁄erentials in
job-￿nding and job-retention rates across groups, directly observing duration
in unemployment and employment or using experiments in audit studies. Al-
though there is agreement in predicting e⁄ects of frictions on wages3, there
is scarce empirical evidence on how much of the wage gap can be accounted
for by di⁄erences in friction patterns.
Estimated structural models may provide a complete interpretation of
observed wage gaps as a consequence of between-groups di⁄erences in wage
determinants. Nevertheless, progress in this direction has been slow mainly
due to the di¢ culty in separately identifying the impacts of skill di⁄erentials
and discrimination from worker-level survey data. The main references are
Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) and Bowlus and Eckstein (2002). Both papers
are focused on racial discrimination in the U.S. and deal with this empir-
ical identi￿cation problem through structural assumptions. Eckstein and
Wolpin (1999) proposed a method based on a two-sided, search-matching
model that formally accounts for unobserved heterogeneity and unobserved
o⁄ered wages. They argued that di⁄erences in the bargaining power para-
meter (their index of discrimination) are not identi￿ed unless some ￿rm-side
data are available, and hence they were forced to simply compute bounds
et al (2005) with data from Mexico, Kawaguchi (2007) with Japanese data, Zhang and
Dong (2009) with Chinese data, Van Biesebroeck, (2009) with data from three Subsaharian
countries.
3See van den Berg and van Vuuren (2003) for a good discussion on this issue.
3for discrimination that ended up being not informative on the estimation
sample they worked with. Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) also proposed a
search model with heterogeneity in workers productivity but including an
appearance-based employer disutility factor. As long as there are ￿rms that
do not discriminate, their method is able to identify between-groups di⁄er-
ences in the skill distribution as well as the discrimination parameter, which
in their case, was the proportion of discriminatory employers4. The focus
of Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) was not on estimation, as the main objective
was to propose an identi￿cation strategy5.
The ￿rst attempt to use an equilibrium search model to study gender
discrimination was made by Bowlus (1997). In her paper, Bowlus only fo-
cused on the e⁄ect of gender di⁄erences in friction patterns on wage di⁄er-
entials without distinguishing between di⁄erences in productivity and dis-
crimination. In a recent paper Flabbi (2010) used the identi￿cation strategy
proposed in Bowlus and Eckstein (2002), but allowing for heterogeneity in
matches productivity6. The model was estimated by maximum likelihood
to study whether gender labor market di⁄erentials are due to labor market
discrimination or to unobserved productivity di⁄erences.
In this paper I propose and estimate an equilibrium search model with
on-the-job search, rent-splitting, and productivity heterogeneity in ￿rms and
workers. The availability of matched employer-employee data furthers iden-
ti￿cation by allowing me to disentangle di⁄erences in workers productivity
across groups from di⁄erences in wage policies toward those groups. I com-
bine productivity measures estimated at the ￿rm level a la Hellerstein and
Neumark (1999), group-speci￿c friction patterns estimated from individual
duration data, and individual wages to estimate the wage equation provided
by the structural model. This structural wage equation states the precise
4Mondal (2006) also estimates a similar model to study racial wage di⁄erentials in the
U.S.
5The model assumes no ￿rm heterogeneity and generates counterfactual implications
on wage distributions. They are only able to match some moments generated by the model
with moments estimated using a sample from the NLSY.
6In order to have a model that is estimable with employee-level data, Flabbi (2010)
only includes heterogeneity at the match level and does not allow for on-the-job search.
Although he allows for wage bargaining, the bargaining power is not estimated.
4relationship between wages, workers ability, ￿rms productivity, friction pat-
terns, and bargaining power.
Most of the variables included in standard wage equations, such as edu-
cation or experience may be understood as proxies of the true wage deter-
minants, that are the worker productivity, the outside options, and the rent
spiting rule. The wage equation presented in this paper may be understood
as the structural counterpart of a standard Mincer-equation, but only in-
cluding theoretically relevant wage determinants7. It allows me to undertake
counterfactual analysis, such as comparing wages of two ex-ante identical
workers in terms of productivity and outside options, who only di⁄er in the
rent-splitting parameter corresponding to their gender8.
The approach presented in this paper links two independent branches
of the wage-discrimination literature. It is a natural step in extending the
structural estimation literature focused on wage discrimination. Due to the
availability of better data, I am able to estimate a more complete model9,
but also, it allows me to use a more robust identi￿cation strategy to measure
di⁄erences in productivity and to have clean measures of the e⁄ect on wages
of labor market segregation. However, this approach may also be understood
as an evolution of the approach proposed by Hellerstein and Neumark (1999)
where only productivity gaps were estimated. Here I am providing a complete
interpretation of the observed wage gap, where the productivity gap is only
one of the potential determinants of the di⁄erence in wages between males
7The structural wage equation may be also understood as an equation that completes
the Hellerstein et al (1999) approach, where wages were assumed to be simply equal to
productivity. The model provide a close form solution in which wages are found to be a
function of productivity but also function of friction patterns and bargaining power.
8Note that a di⁄erence in the bargaining power between men and women is considered
as wage discrimination. This has already been assumed in Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) and
it is meaningful in the sense that an inequality in the rent-splitting parameter generates a
di⁄erence in wages between two workers with the same ability and outside option that are
working in similar jobs in terms of sector and quali￿cation and they only di⁄er in terms
their gender.
9Particularily related with Flabbi (2010), that at the moment is the most complete
structural estimation in the wage-discrimination literature, the model presented in this
paper allows for two-sided heterogeneity and on-the-job search. In the estimation, rent
splitting parameters are not imposed but estimated and I am not forcing the same ￿rms
distribution across gender. See sections 2 and 4 for details.
5and females.
I use a 1996-2005 panel of matched employer-employee data provided by
the German Labor Agency, called LIAB10. This dataset is especially useful
for the current study for two reasons. Firstly, it contains essential individual
variables such as gender, wages and occupation. Secondly, it is a panel that
tracks ￿rms as opposed to individuals, which is important for estimating
production functions using panel estimation methods. To the best of my
knowledge, this paper presents the ￿rst structural estimation using matched
employer-employee data to study labor market discrimination11.
The empirical analysis proceeds by ￿rst calculating di⁄erences in produc-
tivity between men and women, following the approach in Hellerstein and
Neumark (1999). As in this study, I ￿nd important negative productivity
di⁄erentials for women. Next, I analyze group-speci￿c dynamics. I ￿nd that
women have higher job-creation rates than equivalent men, and that females
also have higher job-destruction rates than males. Finally, I estimate group-
speci￿c bargaining power. In spite of having large wage di⁄erentials, on
average, women are only found have slightly lower bargaining power than
men.
In terms of wages, the total gender wage gap is 41 percent. It turns out
that most of the gap, 65 percent, is accounted for by di⁄erences in produc-
tivity. Di⁄erences in destruction rates explain 9 percent while di⁄erences in
the distribution of ￿rm￿ s productivity faced by male and female workers ex-
plain 17 percent of the total wage-gap. Netting out di⁄erences in o⁄er-arrival
rates would increase the gap by 13 percent. Di⁄erences in the rent-splitting
parameter are responsible for 21 percent of the wage gap, which implies that
female workers receive wages 8.6 percent lower than equivalent males.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I describe
the structural model. Section 3 describes the data. In Section 4, I present the
10This dataset is subject to strict con￿dentiality restrictions. It is not direcly available
but only after the IAB has approved the research project, The Research Data Center
(FDZ) provides on site use or remote access to external researchers.
11There is a recent paper by Sulis (2007) that studies gender wage di⁄erentials in Italy,
estimating a structural model. Sulis uses employee level data with ￿rm identi￿ers, without
data on ￿rms, such as capital or output.
6estimation of the structural model inputs, namely the productivity measures
and friction parameters, I present and discuss these intermediate results,
and ￿nally I describe the empirical strategy to estimate the structural wage
equation and its results. In Section 5, the counterfactual experiments are
discussed and I compare my empirical results with those resulting from other
strategies for detecting discrimination using the same data. Conclusions are
o⁄ered in Section 6.
2 Structural framework
In this section I describe the behavioral model of labor market search with
matching and rent-splitting. The main goal of estimating a structural model
is to clearly state a wage setting equation that allows me to measure the
e⁄ect of each wage determinant. Having this wage equation estimated, it is
straightforward to obtain the e⁄ect of discriminatory wage policies, compar-
ing a man￿ s wage with the wage that a woman with the same wage determi-
nants would receive.
Previous research has shown the ability of this kind of models in describ-
ing the labor market outputs and dynamics. Building on these assessments,
in this paper I am interested in using the structural model as a measure-
ment tool that allows me to empirically disentangle the e⁄ect of each wage
determinant on the gender wage gap. Search-matching models has been used
as an instrument to address empirical questions in a variety of papers. Ex-
amples are the previously mentioned papers in the discrimination literature,
but there are also interesting contributions in measuring returns to educa-
tion (Eckstein and Wolpin, 1995) or in analyzing the e⁄ect of a change in the
minimum wage (Flinn, 2006).
This paper presents a quantitative exercise that aims to measure the em-
pirical relevance of wage discrimination. As in Eckstein and Wolpin (1999),
the model does not take an explicit stance on what the sources of wage dis-
crimination are. Rather, I intend to measure if ￿rm￿ s payments di⁄er if the
employee is male or female, ceteris paribus.
An alternative approach is presented in Flabbi (2010). He is also in-
7terested in measuring discrimination, but he assumes that discrimination
comes from employer￿ s tastes. As in Eckstein and Bowlus (2002), employer
heterogeneity in tastes for discrimination, has a fundamental role in his iden-
ti￿cation strategy. Without ￿rm level data, the existence of employers that
do not discriminate is essential to identify di⁄erences in productivity. Having
matched employer employee data allows me to avoid such kind of assump-
tions.
Taking a stand about what type of discrimination is generating the data,
is important because it opens up the possibility for policy experiments. But
policy experiments are more interesting whenever wage discrimination is em-
pirically more relevant. Therefore the ￿rst question that has to be answered
is whether ￿rms set di⁄erent wages by gender.
2.1 Assumptions
I propose a continuous time, in￿nite horizon, stationary economy. This econ-
omy is populated by in￿nitely lived ￿rms and workers. All agents are risk
neutral and discount future income at rate ￿ > 0.
Workers: I normalize the measure of workers to one. Workers may belong
to one of di⁄erent groups (k) de￿ned in terms of gender12. Workers have
di⁄erent abilities (") measured in terms of e¢ ciency units they provide per
unit of time. The distribution of ability in the population of workers is
exogenous and speci￿c to each group, with cumulative distribution function
Lk("). Group-speci￿c distributions of e¢ ciency units provided by workers is
crucial to consider between groups di⁄erences in productivity. This source
of heterogeneity is perfectly observable by every agent in the economy. Each
worker may be either unemployed or employed. The workers from a generic
group k that are not actually working receive a ￿ ow utility, proportional to
their ability, bk":
Firms: Every ￿rm is characterized by its productivity (p). I assume that
p is distributed across ￿rms according to a given cumulative distribution
12The structural model abstracts many dimensions that may be relevant in the wage
setting. In order to compare jobs as similar as possible, the empirical analysis is clustered
at sector and occupation level. See section 4 for details.
8function Hk(p), which is continuously di⁄erentiable with support [pmin;pmax]:
The distribution of ￿rms￿ s productivity is group-speci￿c, what allows the
model to be robust to labor market segregation of workers groups. This
source of heterogeneity is perfectly observable by every agent in the economy.
The opportunity cost of recruiting a worker is zero.
Each ￿rm contacts a worker of a given group k at the same constant rate,
regardless of the ￿rm￿ s bargained wage, its productivity or how many ￿lled
job it has. Unemployed workers receive job o⁄ers at a Poisson rate ￿0k > 0.
Employed workers may also search for a better job while employed and they
receive job o⁄ers at a Poisson rate ￿1k > 0. I treat ￿0k and ￿1k as exogenous
parameters speci￿c to each group k. Searching while unemployed as search-
ing while employed has no cost. Employment relationships are exogenously
destroyed at a constant rate ￿k > 0; leaving the worker unemployed and the
￿rm with nothing. The marginal product of a match between a worker with
ability " and a ￿rm with productivity p is "p:
Whenever an employed worker meets a new ￿rm, the worker must choose
an employer and then, if she switches employers, she bargains with the new
employer with no possibility of recalling her old job. If she stays at her old
job, nothing happens. Consequently when a worker negotiates with a ￿rm,
her alternative option is always the unemployment. The surplus generated
by the match is split in proportions ￿k and (1 ￿ ￿k), for the worker and the
￿rm respectively, where ￿k 2 (0;1); is exogenously given and speci￿c to each
group k. I will refer to ￿k as the rent-splitting parameter. As in Wolpin
and Eckstein (1999), I interpret ￿male ￿ ￿female as an index of the level of
discrimination in the labor market. A di⁄erence in ￿ in the same kind of
job and sector, reveals di⁄erential payments unrelated to productivity and
outside options, which are only driven by belonging to a given group.
It is well known that many other factors may have an impact on the
rent-splitting parameters. the main candidates are, negotiation skills, risk
aversion and the discount factor. In this model agents are assumed to be
risk neutral and the discount rate is homogenous across groups. Although
this could be part of the story that explains di⁄erences in ￿, there are scarce
convincing empirical evidence of gender di⁄erences in these primitive para-
9meters13. This could be the reason why risk aversion and the discount factor
have been held constant across genders in most of the empirical studies on
wage discrimination.
The model assumes that the worker does not have the option of recalling
the old employer, there is no possibility of Bertrand competition between
￿rms as in Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006). Whether to allow ￿rm
competition a la Bertrand or not is controversial. While the Cahuc et al
bargaining scenario may be conceptually more appealing and may help to
avoid the Shimer critique, it is not clear how realistic this assumption is.
Mortensen (2003) argues that countero⁄ers are uncommon empirically, and
Moscarini (2008) shows that, in a model with search e⁄ort, ￿rms may credibly
commit to ignore outside o⁄ers to their employees, letting them go without a
countero⁄er, and su⁄er the loss, in order to keep in line the other employees￿
incentives to not search on the job. Moreover, it can be shown that including
a marginally positive cost of negotiation, it will not be pro￿table for ￿rms to
try to poach the worker to better ￿rms, and then the Bertrand competition
vanishes.
In an environment where contracts cannot be written and wages are con-
tinuously negotiated, the alternative option of the job is always unemploy-
ment. In this context, if a worker receives an o⁄er from a ￿rm with higher
productivity, she must switch. She cannot use this o⁄er to renegotiate with
her current ￿rm, because she knows that tomorrow this o⁄er will not be
available and then her future option will be the unemployment again14. This
possibility is also discussed in Flinn and Mabli (2010).
Beyond the theoretical relevance of between-￿rms Bertrand competition,
this assumption is not critical for most of the results presented in this paper.
13The main contributions come from experiments, see Croson and Gneezy (2009) for a
good survey.
14If wages are continuously negotiated, ￿rms could increase the wage of the worker at
the moment of the on-the-job o⁄er to try to avoid the worker quitting. If the alternative
employer is more productive it can force the transition by also paying a premiun. This
auction for the worker ￿nishes when the actual ￿rm cannot pay more than the full produc-
tivity and transition holds as in a Bertrand competition. This premium may be considered
as a hiring cost for the ￿rm. Modelling this possibility is outside the scope of this paper.
10In the appendix, I show that using the same data with a variation of the
model where between-￿rm Bertrand competition is allowed, the gender wage-
gap decomposition remains practically unchanged.
It is not clear whether ￿ can be interpreted as a Nash bargaining power.
Shimer (2006) argues that in a simple search-matching model with on-the-
job search, the standard axiomatic Nash bargaining solution is inapplicable,
because the set of feasible payo⁄s is not convex. This non-convexity arises
because an increase in the wage has a direct negative e⁄ect over the ￿rm￿ s
rents but an indirect positive e⁄ect raising the duration of the job. This
critique will hold out depending on the shape of the productivity distribution.
Whether ￿ can be understood as a Nash Bargaining Power, is not essential
for this study. If this critique holds up, I still interpret ￿ as a rent-splitting
parameter that simply states the proportion of the surplus that goes to the
worker. A di⁄erence in these parameters remains informative about wage-
discrimination.
This model is similar to the model presented in independent work by Flinn
and Mabli (2010). The main di⁄erence is in the distributions of productivity.
In order to have a model that is estimable with employee-level data only, they
assume that there is a technologically-determined discrete distribution of
worker-￿rm productivity. In other words, they assume discrete heterogeneity
at the match level while here I assume two-side continuous heterogeneity. The
model presented here also have the convenient property of producing a closed
form solution for the wage setting equation.
2.2 Value Functions
The expected value of income for a worker with ability ", who belongs to
group k, currently employed at wage w(p;";k) is denoted by E(w(p;";k);";k)
and it satis￿es:
11￿E(w(p;";k);";k) (1)




[E(~ w(p;";k);";k) ￿ E(w(p;";k);";k)]dF(~ w(p;";k)j";k):
The expected value of being unemployed for a worker with ability ", who
belongs to group k is given by:
￿U(";k)
= bk" + ￿0k
Z w(p;";k)max
w(p;":k)min
[E(~ w(p;";k);";k) ￿ U(";k)]dF(~ w(p;";k)j";k):
Finally, the value of the match with productivity p" for the ￿rm when
paying a wage w(p;";k) to a worker of group k is given by:
￿J(w(p;";k);p;";k) (2)
= p" ￿ w(p;";k) ￿ (￿k + ￿1k ￿ F(w(p;";k)j";k))J(w(p;";k);p;";k);
where ￿ F(w(p;";k)j";k) = 1 ￿ F(w(p;";k)j";k) and F(w(p;";k)j";k) is the
equilibrium cumulative distribution function of wages paid by ￿rms with
productivity lower than p to workers with ability " who belongs to group k.
Note that every parameter is group-speci￿c. As the alternative value of the
match for the ￿rm is always zero, this value does not depend on alternative
matches and therefore it is independent of parameters of the other groups of
workers. Although every group is sharing the same labor market, all the value
functions may be considered group by group as if they were in independent
markets. For notation simplicity I then omit the k-index. Note that w(p;")
is a function of p and ", therefore given p and ", the wage is a redundant
state variable which is only included for exposition simplicity.
These expressions are equivalent to the value functions of the model with
heterogenous ￿rms presented in Shimer (2006) including heterogeneity in
12workers ability. But here, wages are determined by the following surplus
splitting rule:
(1 ￿ ￿)[E(w(p;");") ￿ U(")] = ￿J(w(p;");p;"): (3)
After some algebra (see the appendix for the proof), it can be shown that:







(￿ + ￿ + ￿ ￿ F(~ w(p;")j"))
d(~ w(p;")):
Noting that ￿ F(w(p;")j") = ￿ H(p) and changing the variable within the
integral, I obtain a ￿rst-order di⁄erential equation,










Solving the di⁄erential equation, after some algebra the wage equation
takes the following form:









This expression states a clear relationship between wages w(p;"), work-
ers￿ability ("), ￿rm productivity (p), friction patterns (￿1;￿) and the rent-
splitting parameter (￿): This wage equation is relatively similar to the one
proposed by Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006) when the wage is bar-
gained between a ￿rm with productivity p and an unemployed worker with
ability "15:
As expected the model predicts that the mean equilibrium wage increases
in ￿; and that the mean wage paid by a ￿rm with productivity p increases in
p: Note in (4) that, if ￿ = 1 ) w(p;") = p"; the maximum wage that a ￿rm
15Note that in Cahuc et al (2006) when the wage is bargained between a ￿rm and an
unemployed worker the Bertrand competition does not hold and therefore their proposed
scenario is equivalent to this one. The only di⁄erence comes from the fact that both parts
take into account future Bertrand competition.
13with productivity p can pay to a worker with ability " is the full productivity:
If ￿ = 0 ) w(p;") = pmin"; that is the minimum wage that a worker would
accept to leave unemployment, see Figure 116.
As it can be seen in Figure 1, the mean equilibrium wage increases when
￿1 increases and when ￿ decreases. Many models in the literature predict
that the mean equilibrium wage decreases in the amount of frictions (see for
example the models in Burdett and Mortensen, 1998, Bontemps, Robin and
van den Berg, 2000, Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002 and Cahuc, Postel-Vinay
and Robin 2006). The intuition behind this fact is clearly explained in van
den Berg and van Vuuren (2003). They argue that all of these models are
asymmetric in workers and employers. This asymmetry is due to the fact
that workers correspond to a relatively long-lived unit whereas ￿rms can
expand and contract, and can be created and destroyed relatively quickly.
When frictions decrease, the value of creating a vacancy increases, and this
may prompt an instantaneous in￿ ow of new ￿rms. The latter mitigates the
e⁄ect of the reduction in frictions on the ￿rms whereas it increases the e⁄ect
on the workers, and hence the wage increases.
I have assumed that the economy is in steady state. The standard station-
ary equilibrium conditions are exploited. The in￿ ow must balance the out￿ ow
for every stock of workers, de￿ned in terms of individual ability, employment
status and, for those workers who are employed, ￿rm￿ s productivity.
￿ The in￿ ow to the unemployment must be equal to its out￿ ow, ￿0￿ =





￿ The in￿ ow to jobs in ￿rms with productivity p or lower than p must
be equal to its out￿ ow:
￿0H(p)￿ =
￿
￿1 ￿ H(p) + ￿
￿
G(p)(1 ￿ ￿);
16These simulations are calibrated using the estimated parameters of male skilled work-
ers in the manufacturing sector, see Section 4. Those parameter are: ￿ = 0:292; ￿1 = 0:217
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Figure 1: Wage Setting Equation
where G(p) is the fraction of workers employed at a ￿rm with produc-
tivity p or lower than p: Then using condition (5) and rearranging:
G(p) =
H(p)




￿ . This stationary condition, (or its counterpart in terms
of wages) is quite common and has been broadly used after Burdett
and Mortensen (1998) to infer the primitive distribution of productiv-
ity (or the primitive distribution of wages) when only the distribution
of productivity (or distribution of wages) within employed workers is
observable. Since here I use matched employer-employee data, I can
directly observe the empirical distribution of productivity at ￿rm level.
I only use this stationary condition in order to construct the likelihood
for the duration analysis in section 4.
￿ The fraction of employed workers with ability " or lower than " that are
working in ￿rms with productivity p or lower than p are (1￿￿) ~ F(";p);
15where ~ F(";p) is the joint cdf of " and p: These workers leave this group
due to a better o⁄er or because they become unemployed, such event
occurs with probability (￿+￿1 ￿ H(p)). The in￿ ow to this group is given
by the unemployed workers with ability " or lower than ", (ie: L(")￿)
who receive an o⁄er from a ￿rm with productivity p or lower than
p. This last event occurs with probability ￿0H(p). Then I have the
following condition:
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + ￿1 ￿ H(p))F(";p) = ￿0H(p)L(")￿:
Next using conditions (5) and (6), and rearranging:
F(";p) =
H(p)
(1 + ￿1 ￿ H(p))
L(") = G(p)L("): (7)
This expression says that there is no sorting between ￿rm￿ s productivity
and worker￿ s ability17.
This statement is controversial, and there is an active debate in the as-
sortative matching literature about it. Becker (1973) showed that in a model
without search frictions but with transferable utility, if there are supermodu-
lar production functions, any competitive equilibrium exhibits positive assor-
tative matching. In more recent work, Shimer and Smith (2000) and Atakan
(2006) show that in search models, complementaries in production functions
are not su¢ cient to ensure assortative matching. Assuming di⁄erent cost
functions the ￿rst one predicts a negative correlation while the second one
the opposite.
After Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999), the empirical literature has
mainly focused on estimating the correlation between worker￿ s and ￿rm￿ s
￿xed e⁄ects using matched employer-employee data. However, there are still
no de￿nitive results. Abowd et al found a negative and small correlation
between ￿rms and workers ￿xed e⁄ects for France, and zero correlation for the
U.S. while Lindeboom, Mendez and van den Berg (2010), using a Portuguese
17To show that there is no sorting, condition (7) is necessary but not su¢ cient. We also
need that the pmin; the minimum productivity, is independent of the worker ability. This
condition also holds in this model (the proof is in the appendix).
16matched employer-employee dataset, ￿nd that there is positive assortative
matching.
3 Data
Linked Employer-Employee Data from the German Federal Em-
ployment Agency or LIAB.
I use the linked employer-employee dataset of the IAB (denoted LIAB)
covering the period 1996-2005. LIAB was created by matching the data
of the IAB establishment panel and the process-produced data of the Fed-
eral Employment Services (Social security records). The distinctive feature
of this data is the combination of information about individuals with de-
tails concerning the ￿rms in which these people work. The workers source
contains valuable data on age, sex, nationality, daily wage (censored at the
upper earnings limit for social security contributions18), schooling/training,
the establishment number and occupation based on a 3-digit code that in
this paper is collapsed into two categories: skilled and unskilled jobs.19
The ￿rm￿ s data give details on total sales, value added, investment, depre-
ciation20, number of workers and sector21. In particular, only ￿rms with more
than 10 workers, positive output and positive depreciated capital have been
included in my subsample. Since ￿rms of di⁄erent sectors do not share the
same market, I construct separate samples for each sector. LIAB has a very
detailed industry classi￿cation. I focus on four main industries: Manufactur-
ing, Construction, Trade, and Services22. Participation of establishments is
18In the sample of ￿rms used in this paper, 14.7% of the worker observations have
censored information on wages. This proportion varies signi￿cantly across gender and
occupation. 4.7% of female observations and 18.1% of males observations are censored.
The proportion of worker observations in high-quali￿cation occupations, with wages that
exceed the upper earning limit for social security contributions is 37.0% while the corre-
sponding one to low-quali￿cation occupations is 3.1%.
19I have assigned the following groups to the unskilled category: Agrarian occupations,
manual occupations, services and simple comercial or administrative occupations. While
I have classi￿ed as skilled jobs: Engineers, professional or semi-profesional occupations,
quali￿ed comercial or administrative occupations, and managerial occupations.
20The survey gives information about investment made to replace depreciated capital.
21For a more detailed description of this dataset, see Alda et al (2005)
22The service sector includes three kind of services de￿ned in the survey: industrial
17voluntary, but the response rates are high, exceeding 70 per cent. However,
the response rate in some key-variables for my purpose is lower. Among
survey respondent, only 60% of ￿rms in the previous four industries provide
valid responses for output. To estimate productivity I need data on output
and number of workers in each category. I only consider observations from
the old Federal Republic of Germany (West-Germany). Finally, ￿rms with
strictly less than 10 employees were removed. The ￿nal number of observa-
tions in my sample of ￿rms is 15,174. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics
of the ￿nal sample of ￿rms.
Table 1: Firms - Descriptive Statistics
no of Output no of Women (%) Men (%)
￿rms (mean)* workers Unsk. Skill Unsk. Skill
Manufact. 7,354 151.0 4,297,762 11.9 8.1 55.3 24.7
Construct. 1,491 30.2 170,786 12.9 11.5 58.1 17.6
Trade 2,078 67.4 247,884 30.6 17.5 34.4 17.6
Services 4,251 30.4 1,043,678 21.1 21.0 38.9 20.0
Total 15,174 92.8 5,760,110 14.2 11.0 51.5 23.4
* Per annum total output in millions of euros
One of the main advantages of this data-set is that it has information on
all the employees subject to social security in each ￿rm23. The employee data
are matched to ￿rms for which I have valid estimates of productivity through
a unique ￿rm identi￿er. The raw data contains 21,246,022 observations be-
tween 1996 and 2005, but after this ￿nal trimming I have a 9-year unbalanced
panel, including a total of 5,760,110 workers￿observations distributed into
15,174 ￿rms￿observations.
services, transport and communication, and other services.
23Employees subject to social security are workers, other employees and trainees who
are liable to health, pension and/or unemployment insurance or whose contributions to
pension insurance is partly paid by the employer. The following forms of employment are
not considered liable to social security: civil servants, self-employed persons, unpaid family
workers and so-called "marginal" part-time workers (A "marginal" part-time worker is a
person who is either: employed only short-term or paid a maximum wage of e400 per
month).
18Given this selection, the sample becomes less representative. According
to the Federal Statistical O¢ ce (Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland), be-
tween 1996 and 2005 the proportion of the workforce in the manufacturing
sector ranges between 25.6 and 31.7 percent, while in the sample used in this
paper it exceeds 74%, see Table 1. For that reason, when making inference
on the total population, between-groups aggregation of results is made using
the group weights obtained from GSOEP24.
In the sample women are, on average, younger than men, they have less
tenure and less experience. Women tend to have high-skill occupations with
higher frequency than men. The proportion of immigrants is higher within
the men￿ s group. See Table 2 for details of the workers sample.
Table 2: Workers - Descriptive Statistics
Women Men
Immigrant (%) 8.4 10.4
Age (years) 39.2 40.7
Tenure (years) 10.1 12.0
Experience (years) 15.3 17.1
Skilled (%) 46.4 31.9
Observations 1,290,156 4,130,453
The main goal of this study is to understand the gender wage gap. The
di⁄erence in conditional means is 21 percent (see Table 17 in the appendix).
Meaning that women, on average, have salaries 21 percent lower than men
with the same observable characteristics. The unconditional wage di⁄erential
averages 42 percent, but it is not stable across sectors and occupations (see
24The weights of each groups are estimated with the relative frequencies in the 1996-
2005 sample of the GSOEP, which are: manufacturing-skilled-men 12.3%, manufacturing-
unskilled-men 15.6%, manufacturing-skilled-women 6.1%, manufacturing-unskilled-women
4.8%, construction-skilled-men 4.1%, construction-unskilled-men 7.0%, construction-
skilled-women 1.1%, construction-unskilled-women 0.2%, trade-skilled-men 6.1%, trade-
unskilled-men 2.9%, trade-skilled-women 10.5%, trade-unskilled-women 2.8%, services-
skilled-men 10.3%, services-unskilled-men 4.2%, services-skilled-women 8.7%, services-
unskilled-women 3.1%.
19Table 3). Mean-wages estimated across industries and occupations show that
the gap ranges between 30 percent and 45 percent. Wage gaps are signi￿-
cantly di⁄erent from zero in every sector and in every group, and they are
larger for skilled workers in manufacturing, construction and trade sectors.
Table 3: Gender Wage Gap
Mean Daily-Wage W-Gap
Women Men (%)
Manufact. Unskilled 76.94 109.25 29.57%
(0.41) (0.59) (1.00%)
Skilled 105.74 190.30 44.43%
(0.11) (0.22) (0.33%)
Construct. Unskilled 53.35 96.59 44.77%
(0.14) (0.16) (0.30%)
Skilled 82.81 150.90 45.11%
(0.27) (0.54) (0.81%)
Trade Unskilled 47.64 84.90 43.16%
(0.08) (0.53) (0.51%)
Skilled 67.76 119.20 43.88%
(0.02) (0.09) (0.11%)
Services Unskilled 49.11 88.47 44.80%
(0.07) (0.17) (0.24%)
Skilled 87.44 156.31 44.06%
(0.26) (0.68) (0.94%)
Weighted Average 72.08 124.10 41.93%
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses. Means of log-wage are estimated
using worker-level data maximizing saturated normal-likelihoods at the ￿rm level.
Means of wages are calculated by the moment generating function. Standard errors
are obtained by Delta-Method.
German Socio-Economic Panel
The LIAB version used in this paper is a panel of ￿rms complemented
with workers data. As it does not track workers, it is not possible to dis-
20tinguish between attrition25 and job-termination26. For that reason I use
GSOEP (German Socio-Economic Panel) to estimate group-speci￿c tran-
sition parameters27. The German Socio-economic panel is a representative
repeated survey of households in Germany. This survey has been carried out
annually with the same people and families in Germany since 1984 (but I
only use 1996-2005)28.
4 Empirical Strategy and Results
The discrete nature of annual data implies a complicated censoring of the
continuous-time trajectories generated by the theoretical model. Because of
these complications a potentially e¢ cient full information maximum likeli-
hood is not considered as a candidate for the estimation. Instead, I perform
a multi-step estimation procedure29.
Even though it may be theoretically ine¢ cient, I prefer a step-by-step
method. One reason is that the e¢ ciency of full information maximum like-
lihood is only guaranteed in the case of correct speci￿cation. However I
am interested in having productivity di⁄erences and transition parameter
estimates that are robust to misspeci￿cation in other parts of the model.
Another reason is that transition parameters are better estimated using a
standard labor force survey such as GSOEP.
A multi-step estimation procedure allows me to have control of the source
of variation that is e⁄ectively identifying each parameter. The empirical
identi￿cation of productivity di⁄erences with ￿rm level data is weak and im-
precise. Full-information maximum likelihood may have helped empirically
25There is no attrition in a establishment, which is the unit of observation in the sample.
I lack individuals that may have changed their identi￿er or that have changed establish-
ment without changing ￿rm.
26Unless the worker leaves the establishment and moves to another establishment within
the panel.
27Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006) follow the same strategy for estimating tran-
sition parameters with the French Labor Force Survey.
28See Wagner, Burkhauser, and Behringer (1993) for further details on the GSOEP.
29Multi-step estimation has been done in many papers. Good examples are Bontemps,
Robin, and Van den Berg (2000), Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), and Cahuc, Postel-Vinay
and Robin (2006).
21because data on wages may be used to improve on the productivity esti-
mates, but on the other hand I would not be able to guarantee that such
estimates are solely revealing productivity di⁄erences as opposed to wage
setting inequalities. If the model were the true data generating process this
caveat would not be necessary, because the model does not imply any reverse
causality from wages to productivity, and the noise in productivity estimates
would be only due to the contemporary productivity shock uncorrelated with
wages. However, even in an informal way, models are generally incomplete
and it seems prudent to use estimators that are as robust to misspeci￿cation
as possible.
The structural model abstracts many dimensions that may be relevant in
the wage setting, for example amenities or union pressure. These omitted
dimensions may be mainly associated with di⁄erent types of jobs. As it
can be seen in Tables 1 and 2 there are important di⁄erences between men
and women in terms of occupation and sector. In order to compare jobs
which are as similar as possible, the empirical analysis is clustered at the
sector and occupation level. The model is estimated independently for each
of the four sectors. In order to control for occupation; transition parameters
and the rent-splitting parameter are also estimated independently for both
types of jobs, in each sector and gender group. I only control for occupation
parametrically when I estimate productivity, because I need to consider the
full workforce in each ￿rm.
4.1 Productivity
The production function speci￿cation chosen in the empirical section, is a
standard Cobb-Douglas function with constant returns to scale and quality
adjusted labor input. This function has already been used in the discrimina-
tion literature to estimate between-group productivity di⁄erences and it is
also consistent with the theory proposed in the previous section. The value







22Where Kjt is the total capital, Aj is a ￿rm-speci￿c productivity parameter,
ujt is a zero mean stationary productivity shock and Ljt is the total amount







As it was previously mentioned, I have four types of workers depending on
gender (men and women) and occupation (skilled and unskilled). I normalize
￿ms = 1 considering male skilled workers as the reference group30. Now ￿k =
~ ￿k=~ ￿ms is the proportional productivity of group k relative to the productivity
of male skilled workers. Imposing constant returns to scale and assuming
that ￿rms can adjust capital instantaneously makes this speci￿cation totally
consistent with the theory, where I have assumed that the productivity of a
match is p". Section A.3 in the appendix provides more details and robustness
checks on this assumption.
Using the panel with ￿rm level data on value-added31 (Yjt), depreciated
capital32 (Kd
jt) and number of workers in each category, I estimate the pro-
duction function in logs forcing constant returns to scale and constant pro-
portionality between occupation across gender (￿wu = ￿w ￿ ￿u).











jt ) + ujt
where Lws
jt and Lms
jt are, respectively, the number of women and men in
skilled occupations in ￿rm j at time t while Lwu
jt and Lmu
jt are, respectively,
the number of women and men in unskilled occupations in ￿rm j at time t:
30Due to this normalization, the ￿rm speci￿c productivity ~ Aj is rede￿ned as Aj￿￿l
ms:
31I only use value-added in manufacturing. Output measures are used in construction,
trade and services due to lack of convergence of estimates based on value-added. Assum-
ing that a constant fraction of output is spent in materials, both types of estimates are
consistent for the same parameters, the di⁄erence goes to the constant term. In order
to use ￿rm productivity measures in the structural wage equation both measures are not
equivalent because the constant term matters, and hence, value-added is used in every
sector.
32Assuming that a constant fraction (d) of capital depreciates by unit of time: Kd
jt =
d ￿ Kjt ) log(Kd
jt) = log(d) + log(Kjt): Therefore ￿k log(d) goes to the constant term.
23The model predicts that more productive ￿rms are able to attract more
workers of every type. As a result the total labor input would be correlated
with the ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ect. Therefore, I estimate (8) by Within-Groups Non
Linear Least Squares to remove the ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects.
Table 4: Production Function Estimates
WG-NLLS Estimates of (8)
￿l ￿w ￿u
Manufacturing 0.963 0.672 0.484
(0.005) (0.062) (0.042)
Construction 0.961 0.701 0.444
(0.006) (0.052) (0.039)
Trade 0.971 0.804 0.487
(0.009) (0.092) (0.056)
Services 0.945 0.588 0.298
(0.007) (0.068) (0.030)
Weighted Average 0.96 0.67 0.43
Note: Time dummies included. Robust Standard errors are given in parentheses.
Weighted averages take into account the number of ￿rms in each sector.
The Non-Linear Within Groups results are shown in Table 4. Women￿ s
productivity is lower than men￿ s productivity in similar jobs. This di⁄erence
ranges between 20 percent and 41 percent. On average across cells, female
workers are 33% less productive than male ones in each job. One of the main
candidates to explain this large productivity gap is that these estimates are
not taking into account than women works on average less hours than men.
Using the GSOEP33, I ￿nd that the average hour-gap is 19.9 percent, hence
di⁄erences in hours are likely to be one of the main determinants of the
productivity-gap34.
Unskilled workers are also found to be between 51 percent and 70 per-
cent less productive than skilled workers. As in most production function
33LIAB does not provide information on hours.
34Although di⁄erences in hours are shown to be important, the main results of this
paper remain valid. I only mention them in order to have a better understanding of the
estimated productivity gap. See Section 5.1 for a more detailed discussion on this issue.
24estimations using microdata, ￿l is found to be very near one and hence, ￿k
is very small but statistically di⁄erent from zero. Although this ￿nding is
standard35, the main results of this paper are not very sensitive to this issue.
If instead of ￿l = 0:96; I include an a priori more realistic value of ￿l = 0:60;
the wage gap decomposition does not change signi￿cantly.
Pioneered by Hellerstein and Neumark (1999) and Hellerstein, Neumark
and Troske (1999), di⁄erences in productivity across gender are now well
documented in the literature. The ￿rst paper ￿nds, with Israeli ￿rm-level
data, a productivity gap of 17 percent while the second, using a U.S. sample
of manufacturing plants reports a productivity gap of 15 percent. These
studies have been criticized mainly due to the potential endogeneity of the
proportion of female workers in the ￿rm36. In this paper, I treat the number
of workers of each group as potentially correlated with the ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ect37.
Estimating (8) by Within-Groups Non Linear Least-Squares the ￿rm ￿xed
e⁄ect is completely removed, hence my estimates are robust to any correlation
of the labor input level and the labor input composition with the ￿rm ￿xed
e⁄ect.
In this dataset there is strong evidence of correlation between the ￿rm￿ s
￿xed e⁄ect and the ￿rm￿ s labor input. Estimating (8) by NLLS without
￿xed e⁄ects, ￿0s estimates are signi￿cantly lower, the average of ￿NLLS
w across
sectors is 0.38 and the average of ￿NLLS
u across sectors is 0.26. See Table 12
in the appendix.
Estimating (8) by non-linear within-groups the ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ect is re-
moved, but the simultaneity problem is not totally solved. One alternative
would be to treat Ljt and Kjt as predetermined variables and to estimate
the production function by Non Linear GMM. This possibility has been at-
tempted, but there is a severe problem of lack of precision on the GMM
estimates of the ￿ parameters.
35One interpretation of this result is that Kd
jt only captures variable capital whereas
￿xed capital is subsumed in the ￿rm e⁄ect. But if so, the constant returns restriction is
dubious
36See Altonji & Blank (1999).
37Indeed, the model predicts that more productive ￿rms are able to attract more workers
of every type. Therefore, the total labor input will be correlated with the ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ect
but not the labor input composition.
25The precision in the non-linear GMM estimates of ￿0s is low in every
sector, also using with di⁄erent sets of instruments. ￿ has been estimated
using: Only lagged levels for the equation in di⁄erences as in Arellano and
Bond (1991); lagged levels for the equation in di⁄erences and lagged di⁄er-
ences to instrument the equation in levels as in Arellano and Bover (1995)
and only lagged di⁄erences to instrument the equation in levels as in Cahuc
et al. (2006). These three alternative sets of moment conditions have been
used treating the proportion of each kind of worker as endogenous, but also
as exogenous and the estimated ￿ remained imprecise.
As productivity di⁄erentials end up being the main cause of the wage
gaps, I was particularly concerned about the robustness of their estima-
tion. I obtained extremum estimators that minimizes the two-stage robust
GMM2 objective function and iterated-GMM but also Chernozhukov and
Hong (2003) MCMC type of estimators for Continuously-updated GMM.
Non-Linear System GMM and NLLS estimates of the production function
are reported in section A.3 in the appendix38.
The lack precision in the quality parameter estimates is a pervasive prob-
lem in this kind of production function speci￿cation. In Cahuc, Postel-Vinay
and Robin (2006), the authors have ￿nally decided to estimate the produc-
tivity parameters and the wage equation parameter simultaneously by an
iterated non-linear least squares procedure without removing the ￿rm￿ s ￿xed
e⁄ect.
4.2 Labor Market Dynamics
Given that job terminations occur due to a job-to-job transitions or to the
exogenous job destruction, and that both processes are Poisson, the model




￿ + ￿1 ￿ H(p)
￿
e
￿[￿+￿1 ￿ H(p)]t: (9)
38MATA codes for computing the non-linear estimators previously described are avail-
able from the author upon request.
26As I use GSOEP to estimate transition parameters and this dataset
does not have productivity measures, ￿1 and ￿ are estimated treating p
as an unobservable. Therefore, I maximize the unconditional likelihood
L(t) =
R
L(tjp)g(p)dp; where g(p) is the probability density function of ￿rm￿ s
productivity among employed workers.
Taking derivatives with respect to p in equation (6), I get the density of
￿rm￿ s productivity in the population of workers:
g(p) =
(1 + ￿1)h(p)
1 + ￿1 ￿ H(p)
(10)
In the appendix I show the individual contribution to the unconditional










Integrating unobserved productivity out of the conditional likelihood re-
moves p and all reference to the sampling distribution H(p) (Cahuc et al,
2006). This method is robust to any misspeci￿cation in the wage bargaining.
The only property of the structural model that is required, is that there exist
a scalar ￿rm index, in this case p; which monotonously de￿nes transitions.
In the appendix, I show how to obtain the exact form of the likelihood that
takes into account that some durations are right-censored while some others
started before the survey￿ s beginning. Finally, an individual contribution to
the log-likelihood is:



































Where ci is a right-censored spell indicator and Hi is the time period
elapsed before the sample started39.
39The MATA code for computing the exponential integral and the MATA code to max-
27Table 5: Transition Parameters - Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Unskilled
Women Men
￿1 ￿ ￿1 ￿1 ￿ ￿1
Manufact. 0.406 0.044 9.202 0.314 0.031 10.095
(0.041) (0.004) (0.127) (0.021) (0.002) (0.176)
Construct. 0.601 0.098 6.085 0.437 0.105 4.162
(0.188) (0.031) (0.150) (0.025) (0.006) (0.118)
Trade 0.5257 0.094 5.613 0.432 0.074 5.478
(0.050) (0.009) (0.085) (0.042) (0.008) (0.090)
Services 0.559 0.095 5.866 0.458 0.086 5.313
(0.051) (0.009) (0.073) (0.037) (0.007) (0.049)
Skilled
Women Men
￿1 ￿ ￿1 ￿1 ￿ ￿1
Manufact. 0.308 0.044 7.025 0.217 0.034 6.373
(0.031) (0.004) (0.316) (0.015) (0.002) (0.103)
Construct. 0.510 0.090 5.691 0.255 0.071 3.620
(0.095) (0.017) (0.107) (0.025) (0.006) (0.048)
Trade 0.327 0.060 5.459 0.353 0.050 7.093
(0.020) (0.004) (0.078) (0.032) (0.004) (0.219)
Services 0.393 0.073 5.363 0.227 0.050 4.547
(0.024) (0.004) (0.062) (0.015) (0.003) (0.051)
Note: Per annum estimates. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
Maximum likelihood estimates are reported in Table 5. The average du-
ration of an employment spell, 1=￿ (possibly changing employer) is between
10 and 32 years, but the mean-duration across sectors is 20.2 years. The
average time between two outside o⁄ers, 1=￿1, ranges from 1.7 to 4.6 years.
These results seem to be fairly large but they are compatible with others in
the literature. van den Berg and Ridder (2003) using a similar speci￿cation
but with German aggregated data, ￿nd ￿ equal to 0.060 and ￿1 equal to
6.540, while here a weighted average of ￿ across sectors and groups is 0.0574
imize this likelihood are available from the author upon request.
40van den Berg and Ridder (2003, p.237) report monthly rates for ￿1 = 0:028 and
￿1 = ￿1
￿ = 6:5:
28and the weighted average of ￿1 is 6.41.
Skilled workers have in general lower transition rates to unemployment
and lower on-the-job o⁄er arrival rates. Women are more mobile than men
in terms of job-to-job transitions and, in general, they also have higher job-
destruction rates. Considering ￿i as an index of frictions it is noteworthy that
in general, women and unskilled workers su⁄er higher labor market frictions
than men and skilled workers respectively.
4.3 The Wage Equation: Closing the Model




where wj;t;i is the daily wage of a worker i; who belongs to a group k(i), in





















Ek(") = ￿k is the mean e¢ ciency units of workers in group k in that market
relative to the male skilled group. Therefore the predicted mean wage for




The group chosen for normalization is unimportant. Changing this group
to a generic group k; we would change our measure of productivity. Instead
29of pj, that is, the productivity measured in terms of e¢ ciency units of skilled
males, we would have pk
j = ￿kpj ; that is, the productivity measured in termof
e¢ ciency units of group k: In fact, to de￿ne (11) in terms of the productivity
of group k; we only need to put ￿k inside the expectation operator:
E(wj;t;i) = E(￿k(i)pj;t ￿
































For each ￿rm in the sample I estimate the average daily wage ￿ wjtk paid
to workers of group k at time t. Since wages are top-coded, I estimate the
￿rm mean-wage for each worker group (ie : ￿ wjtk) by maximum likelihood at
the ￿rm level assuming that wages are log-normal41: Under the steady state
assumption and according to the theory presented in section 2, ￿ wjtk exhibits
stationary ￿ uctuation around the steady state mean wage E(wjtk) paid by
￿rm j with productivity pj.
I estimate equation (11) in logs with ￿rm-level data, that is to estimate
41Wages are linear in " and there is not other source of within ￿rm variation in wages.
Therefore, the within ￿rm distribution of wages is the same than the distribution of ability.
I am assuming log-normality in the distribution of ":
30log ￿ wjtk = ln(￿k) + (12)
ln
￿












by weighted non-linear least squares at the ￿rm level, where ￿k, ￿k and ￿k are
parameters estimated in previous stages, pj;t is the productivity42 of ￿rm j at
time t and vjtk is a transitory shock with unrestricted variance. As usual, the
discount factor has been set to an annual rate of 5% (daily rate of 0.0134%).
Standard errors have to take into account that ￿;￿1 and ￿ are estimated
in previous stages. To solve this problem I combine bootstrap for ￿ with
the analytical solution for ￿1 and ￿. Hence, I obtain standard errors repli-
cating the productivity estimation and the bargaining power estimation in
200 resamples of the LIAB original sample, with replacement, but taking the
transition parameters as the population ones. To correct these preliminary
standard errors, I add to them the analytical term corresponding to the stan-
dard errors of ￿1 and ￿ reported in Table 5. Finding the analytical solution
is not di¢ cult in this case because estimators come from di⁄erent samples so
that I can omit the term corresponding to the outer product of scores in the
￿rst and second stages.
Consistent standard errors are given by:
\ V ar(^ ￿) = V ar(^ ￿j^ ￿1;^ ￿)bootstrap +
^ H￿￿1
\ V ar(^ ￿1) ^ H￿￿1 + ^ H￿￿
\ V ar(^ ￿) ^ H￿￿
^ H￿￿ ￿ ^ H￿￿
where H is the objective function in the optimization, which in this case is




@￿ . Second derivatives of H are
42See section A.4 in the appendix for details about how I recover pjt using parameters
estimated in previous stages. In section A.4 I also present robustness checks on di⁄erent
assumptions regarding the construction of pjt.
31obtained numerically43.
Results are presented in Table 6. Women are found to have lower rent-
spitting parameters than men in construction and trade for both skilled and
unskilled occupations, and in manufacturing skilled occupations. Female
workers receive larger portion of the surplus than males in services and in
manufacturing unskilled occupations but these di⁄erences are not signi￿cant.
Table 6: Rent-Splitting Parameter Estimates
.
WNLLS estimates of (12)
Women Men
￿ ￿
















Note: Corrected Bootstrap Standard errors are given in parentheses.
There is a clear pattern in terms of skilled and unskilled occupations.
Unskilled workers receive larger shares of the surplus in every sector, consid-
ering female and male workers44. These ￿ndings are not consistent with the
43The analytical correction
^ H￿￿1
\ V ar(^ ￿1) ^ H￿￿1+ ^ H￿￿
\ V ar(^ ￿) ^ H￿￿
^ H￿￿￿ ^ H￿￿ is not signi￿cant in any in-
dustry either for skilled or like the unskilled workers.
44These di⁄erences, as di⁄erences between industry may be understood as consequences
32results found in Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006), where they report a
positive association between bargaining power and job quali￿cation.
Estimates of the rent-splitting parameter are considerably higher than the
ones reported on Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006). This is probably
due to di⁄erences in our de￿nition of match rents45. In a similar model
estimated with US employee-level data by Flinn and Mabli (2010), the overall
bargaining power is found to be 0.45 while here the weighted average across
cells is remarkably similar, 0.421.
Allowing between-￿rms Bertrand competition as in Cahuc, Postel-Vinay
and Robin (2006), changes the magnitude of ￿; but not the gender di⁄er-
ences. In the appendix, I show a numerical exercise, where ￿ are recovered
by the simulated method of moments using the same data and a model with
between-￿rms Bertrand competition. The bargaining power is found to be
signi￿cantly lower, the weighted average is 0.219 in this case, but the gender
and occupation patterns do not change. Women are found to have, lower
bargaining power than males in the construction and trade, while there is
not a clear pattern in manufacturing and services. As in the model with-
out Bertrand competition, workers in low quali￿cation occupations are also
found to have higher ￿ than workers in high quali￿cation occupations, which
suggests that this occupation pattern is not a modelling artifact, but only a
di⁄erence between German and French labor markets46.
Di⁄erences in rent-splitting parameters are not signi￿cant in every sector.
I only ￿nd that male workers receive larger shares of the surplus than female
ones in the construction sector, where bootstrap p-values of the di⁄erences
in ￿ are 95.5% for unskilled workers and 90.4% for skilled ones.
of compensating di⁄erentials or di⁄erences in union pressure. They cannot be understood
as discrimination because we are comparing occupations and not workers.
45The surplus is de￿ned in terms of the productivity of the match and the outside option.
Both models imply di⁄erent outside options. Without Bertrand competition the worker
outside option is the unemployment. While allowing for Bertrand competition, the worker
outside option is the whole productivity of the poaching ￿rm. As the outside option in
the model with Bertrand competition dominates the one in the model without Bertrand
competition, the estimated bargaining power is smaller.
46See Section A.5 for details.
335 Wage-Gap Decomposition
The structural wage setting equation provides us with a direct way of isolating
the e⁄ect of each wage determinant over the overall wage di⁄erential. Hence,
we are able to calculate which fraction of the wage gap is due to segregation or
di⁄erences in the rent-splitting parameter, productivity or friction patterns.
Using the structural wage equation (4):
wj;t;i = "iw
p(pj;t;￿k(i);Hk(i)(p);￿1k(i);￿k(i))
for each sector and each worker group it is possible to measure the wage
di⁄erential caused by di⁄erences in each wage determinant. For example I
can estimate the wage gap accounted by ￿ as the relative di⁄erence between
the mean-wage that women actually receive and the mean wage that women





As shown in equation (7) " is independent of p; therefore I can estimate









Nj ￿ wp (pj;t;￿M;HW(p);￿1;W;￿W)
Where Nj is the number of female workers in each ￿rm. In order to have
a complete decomposition of the wage gap, I replace sequentially each female
parameter for a male parameter until I reach the male predicted mean wage:
Counterfactual wages are presented in Table 7
Di⁄erences in friction patterns imply di⁄erences in the observed distrib-
utions of ￿rm productivity within the employed workers of di⁄erent groups.
This is true also when both groups face the same primitive distribution of
productivity, see condition (6). Consequently, di⁄erences in frictions imply
two e⁄ects over wages. The ￿rst one is the direct e⁄ect on the wage of a
worker ", who belong to the group k, working in a ￿rm p, this is the e⁄ect
34displayed on ￿gure 1. And the second e⁄ect is the one that comes from
aggregation due to changes in the distribution of accepted wages.
The wage setting equation implies that the higher the o⁄er-arrival rate,
the higher the wage, and the higher the job destruction rate the lower the
wage, see Figure 1. But also increasing the o⁄er-arrival rate makes the coun-
terfactual ￿rm￿ s productivity distribution among workers to stochastically
dominate the original one, while increasing the destruction rate has the op-
posite e⁄ect47. Hence, the direct e⁄ect and the aggregation e⁄ect go in the
same direction when we change ￿1 and ￿:
I only observe the primitive distribution of productivity, that is the empir-
ical distribution of p at the ￿rm level, the distribution of productivity among
males, and the distribution of productivity among females. I cannot estimate
the wage equation with the counterfactual distribution of productivity only
changing one friction parameter. Therefore, the counterfactual wages are cal-
culated simulating the distribution of productivity faced by female workers
using the friction parameters of male workers48.
Considering the direct e⁄ect and the aggregation e⁄ect together the e⁄ect
of frictions is signi￿cant. I ￿nd that on average across sectors, gender di⁄er-
ences in destruction rates, explain 9% of the total wage gap, while decreasing
47Given that the o⁄er arrival rate of women is higher than the one of men, the distribu-
tion of ￿rms productivity across the population of female worker stochastically dominates
the couterfactual distribution of ￿rm￿ s productivity corresponding to female workers if
































48The model used for simulations is a simpli￿ed version of the model presented in Sec-
tion 2, where the worker heterogeneity has been omitted. Simulations use the punctual
estimates of ￿1; ￿; ￿w; ￿u and ￿l for every sector and worker group, reported in Section
3. I assume that the primitive distribution of ￿rms productivity is log-normal. The mean
of the distribution of ￿rm￿ s productivity is calibrated in equilibrium matching mean wages
in each occupation group and in each sector.
MATA codes for simulating the model previously described are available from the author
upon request.





















Mean-Daily ￿M ￿M ￿M ￿F ￿F ￿F








Manufact. Sk. 190.3 153.6 151.1 101.5 95.2 105.7
Unsk. 109.2 114.1 116.2 78.1 71.0 76.9
Construct. Sk. 150.9 103.1 104.6 73.3 69.5 82.8
Unsk. 96.6 56.3 68.1 47.7 48.5 53.3
Trade Sk. 119.2 84.7 92.8 74.6 69.7 67.8
Unsk. 84.9 76.2 58.6 47.1 42.9 47.6
Services Sk. 156.3 194.7 138.3 81.3 71.6 87.4
Unsk. 88.5 97.6 80.6 47.4 45.7 49.1
Weighted Average 124.1 113.1 103.9 70.0 65.1 72.1
the female o⁄er arrival rate to be equal to the male one, would increase 13%
the gap. Di⁄erences in ￿ are part of the gap, while di⁄erences in ￿1; reduce
the gap, therefore the e⁄ects of both type of frictions are partially compen-
sated. The sizes of these e⁄ects are consistent with Bowlus (1997), where
using samples of high school and college graduates from the National Lon-
gitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) these behavioral patterns were found to
account for 20% - 30% of the wage di⁄erentials.
It is possible to disentangle the direct e⁄ect of frictions on wages from
the aggregation e⁄ect. For this purpose I calculate the mean wage of women,
changing the frictions parameters but keeping their original distribution of
￿rms productivity as it is shown in Figure 1. These e⁄ects are surprisingly
small, di⁄erences in ￿ explain, on average, 1.3 percent of the total wage gap,
while netting out ￿1 would increase the wage-gap in 2.4 percent. In view of
that, most of the e⁄ect of frictions comes through the aggregation e⁄ect.
The proportion of the wage gap that is due to di⁄erences in productivity
connects directly with a branch of the literature initiated with Hellerstein
et al (1999). In this line of work, they assumed equality between wages
36and productivity, and therefore any inequality in wages that is not driven
by di⁄erences in productivity may be considered as discrimination. Here
wages and productivity are connected in a more sophisticated manner, in
fact this relationship has been shown to be not an equality, not even for
the non-discriminated group49. On average, 65 percent of the total wage
gap is accounted for by di⁄erences in productivity. The role of productivity
in explaining the wage gap is large but not surprising given the de￿nition
of productivity used in this exercise. Behind these large productivity-gaps,
there are important di⁄erences in productivity determinants. It can be seen
on Table 2 that there are signi￿cant di⁄erences in age, tenure and potential
experience. Moreover, there is also evidence of large di⁄erences in education
attainment across gender in Germany50.
There is a large literature studying the e⁄ect of segregation over the wage
gap51. The structural estimation allows me to compare the current mean-
wage of female workers with the counterfactual female mean-wage if they
face the primitive distribution of ￿rm￿ s productivity faced by male workers
(ie: changing HW(p) for HM(p)). I ￿nd that 17 percent of the wage gap
is accounted for by this di⁄erence. These results are consistent with results
presented in Bayard, Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske (2003). Where, using
matched employer-employee data from the U.S., they found a negative and
small e⁄ect of the proportion of women in the establishment, over wages.
One of the advantages of the estimation of this structural model is that it
allows us to empirically disentangle the e⁄ect of segregation from di⁄erences
in the distribution of ￿rm￿ s productivity generated by gender di⁄erences in
friction patterns52.
The e⁄ect of di⁄erences in productivity is not stable across occupation,
three quarters of wage gap is explained by di⁄erences in productivity in low
quali￿cation occupations, while this proportion reduces to 58% when con-
49wijt = "ipjt , ￿ = 1; but ￿ is statistically di⁄erent from one in every sector and in
every worker group.
50See Lauer (2003)
51See Altonji and Blank (1999).
52To the best of my knowledge, up to the moment there is no paper disentangling both
e⁄ects.
37sidering high quali￿cation occupations. Finally, these productivity measures
are not on hourly-basis, and the numbers of hours signi￿cantly di⁄er between
male and female workers, see Section 5.1 for a more detailed discussion on
this issue.
Table 8: Gender Wage-Gap decomposition
.
% of the Wage-Gap explained by
Differences in Unskilled Skilled All
￿ 10.3 8.5 9.3
￿ -12.6 -13.8 -13.3
￿ 74.5 58.3 65.1
H(p) 23.5 13.4 17.7
￿ 4.2 33.6 21.2
Wage-Gap 39.0 44.3 41.9
On average, 21 percent of the total wage gap is accounted for by dif-
ferences in the rent-splitting parameter. This means that women receive
wages 9 percent lower than the ones received by equivalent men. This ￿nd-
ing is di⁄erent to what I obtained using the traditional approach based on
Mincer-equations, where female workers are found to receive wages that are
15 percent lower than those of equivalent male workers (see Section A.6 in
the appendix). As in the case of di⁄erences in productivity, di⁄erences in
the wage setting parameter are also occupation-speci￿c. As it can be seen
in Table 8, this di⁄erence turns out to be an important determinant of the
gender wage gap of workers in high quali￿cation occupation, while it explains
almost nothing of the wage gap in the low quali￿cation jobs, this is consistent
with the growing literature on glass ceiling.
5.1 Productivity-gap and di⁄erences in hours
One possible explanation to the large estimated productivity and wage gaps,
may be that male workers work more hours than female ones. One of the
main limitations of the LIAB is that it does not provide any measure of hours.
Therefore the estimated di⁄erences in productivity, and the estimated dif-
38ferences in wages are not on hourly-basis. In order to tackle this problem
one alternative is to look for an external source of information about hours
worked by each group in each sector. Using the GSOEP, I ￿nd signi￿cant
di⁄erences in mean-hours between genders, see Table 9. On average, female
workers are found to work almost 20% less hours than their male counter-
parts.
Table 9: Mean-Hours Per Week
Men Women Hours-Gap
Manufact. Unsk. 39.95 38.84 12.8%
(0.10) (0.21) (0.56%)
Sk. 41.68 38.69 7.2%
(0.08) (0.32) (0.78%)
Construct. Unsk. 43.09 34.40 20.2%
(0.26) (1.65) (3.85%)
Sk. 43.62 38.74 11.2%
(0.12) (0.97) (2.24%)
Trade Unsk. 41.23 28.27 31.4%
(0.47) (0.45) (1.35%)
Sk. 44.01 33.89 23.0%
(0.24) (0.52) (1.25%)
Services Unsk. 44.67 28.12 37.0%
(0.43) (0.40) (1.08%)
Sk. 46.33 42.08 9.2%
(0.30) (0.72) (1.66%)
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses. Means of weekly-hours are
estimated using worker-level data from the GSOEP. Standard errors of the
Hours-Gap are obtained by Delta-Method.
As the structural wage equation is linear in workers￿ability, correcting for
hours does not a⁄ect the estimated rent-splitting parameters53. Nevertheless,





Therefore h is cancelled out of both sides of the equation and the original wage setting
equation holds.
39an interesting exercise is to have an hourly-wage-gap decomposition directly
plugging the hour correction54. Correcting mean-wages using mean-hours is
going to be valid whenever hours worked are uncorrelated with wages, and
there is evidence suggesting that this may be the case55.
Table 10: Gender Wage-Gap decomposition
.
% of the Hourly Wage Gap explained by
Differences in Unskilled Skilled All
￿ 32.0 11.1 17.7
￿ -39.2 -18.1 -25.4
￿ 43.8 21.8 48.3
H(p) 53.7 15.7 27.0
￿ 9.6 39.4 32.4
Wage-Gap 17.1 37.8 27.5
Results are presented in Table 10. When correcting for hours, the wage
gap is signi￿cantly smaller. I ￿nd that the average hourly-wage gap is 27.5%.
A smaller fraction of this gap, 48 percent, is now explained by di⁄erences in
productivity and on the other hand, a larger fraction of the gap, 32%56, is
due to di⁄erences in rent-splitting parameters. Segregation is responsible for
27 percent of the unconditional wage-gap in hourly basis. Netting out the
o⁄er arrival rate would increase the hourly-wage di⁄erential in 25 percent
and if women had the male destruction rate, the gap would be 17 percent
smaller.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper presents the ￿rst estimation of an equilibrium search model using
matched employer-employee data to study wage discrimination. This kind
54I must thank Zvi Eckstein for this suggestion.
55See Blundell and MaCurdy (1999).
56As before female workers are receiving wages 6.2 percent lower than equivalent males
due to di⁄erences in the rent-splitting parameter. This number does not change because
the rent-splitting parameter estimates don￿ t change.
40of data is essential for structurally analyzing labor market discrimination
mainly because:
￿ It allows us to have a clear distinction between di⁄erences in workers
productivity across groups and di⁄erences in wage policies toward those
groups.
￿ It makes the estimation simpler, and therefore more complete models
may be estimated.
￿ It provides a clear way to empirically disentangle the e⁄ect of labor
market segregation, from the e⁄ect of frictions on the distribution of
accepted wages.
The structural estimation involved several steps: Firstly, I estimated
group-speci￿c productivity relying on production functions estimation at the
￿rm-level using LIAB. Secondly, I computed job-retention and job-￿nding
rates using GSOEP employee-level data. Finally, I estimated the wage-
setting parameters (bargaining power) using individual wage records in LIAB,
and transition parameters and productivity measures speci￿c to each ￿rm es-
timated in previous steps.
When analyzing productivity, I observe that women are 33 percent less
productive than men in similar jobs, this di⁄erence is reduced to 17.5 percent
if I control for di⁄erences in hours. The main ￿ndings in terms of friction
patterns are that women are in general more mobile than men in terms of job-
to-job transitions and they have also higher job-destruction rates. In spite
of having large wage di⁄erentials, only in the construction sector women are
found to have signi￿cantly lower rent-splitting parameters than men.
In terms of wages, I ￿nd that the unconditional gender wage gap is 42
percent. It turns out that most of the gap is accounted for by di⁄erences in
productivity. Di⁄erences in destruction rates explain 9 percent of the total
wage-gap and segregation is responsible for 17% of this wage di⁄erential.
Netting out di⁄erences in o⁄er-arrival rates would increase the gap by 13
percent. Di⁄erences in the rent-splitting parameter generate 21% of the
41wage gap, which implies that female workers receive wages 9 percent lower
than equivalent males.
There are two desirable extensions that I would like to perform. Firstly
and more important, gender productivity gaps have been found to be very
large, also controlling for di⁄erences in hours. I have proposed many robust-
ness checks testing for di⁄erent identi￿cation strategies, what ensures that
the large gender productivity gap are not a statistical artifact. The main
question, that stays unsolved after this paper, is understanding what is be-
hind these gaps. Secondly, ￿rm￿ s productivity is estimated in a large N, but
small T panel, hence there is an issue of a non-vanishing small-T measure-
ment error in estimated ￿rm￿ s ￿xed e⁄ects. It would be interesting to obtain
￿ estimates that take this problem into account.
A Appendix
A.1 Model Equations: Proofs
In this subsection, I derive analytically the close form solution of the equi-
librium wage equation. The ￿rst step is to ￿nd the partial derivative with
respect to the wage of the value of a job in a ￿rm with productivity p for a
worker with ability ":





(r + ￿ + ￿1 ￿ F(w(p;")j"))
(14)











E(w(p;");") ￿ E(w(pmin;");") = E(w(p;");") ￿ U(")
Using the surplus splitting rule (3), the value of the job for the worker
(1), the value of the job for the ￿rm (2) and rearranging:
42w(p;") = p" ￿ (15)























and taking derivatives with respect to p:
d(w(p;"))















Then, plugging equation (15):
d(w(p;"))
dp0 = " +
￿1h(p)
w(p;") ￿ p"










￿ + ￿ + ￿1 ￿ H(p)
w(p;") = "￿
￿
￿ + ￿ + ￿1 ￿ H(p) + ￿1h(p)p
￿ + ￿ + ￿1 ￿ H(p)
￿
(16)
To solve this di⁄erential equation, note that:
d(￿ + ￿ + ￿1 ￿ H(p))￿￿
dp
= (￿ + ￿ + ￿1 ￿ H(p))
￿￿ ￿￿1h(p)
￿ + ￿ + ￿1 ￿ H(p)








￿ + ￿ + ￿1 ￿ H(p) + ￿1h(p)p
￿




Integrating (17) between pmin and p, and noting that the lowest produc-
tivity ￿rm will produce no surplus , w(pmin;") = pmin", straightforward
algebra shows that:
w(p;")(￿ + ￿ + ￿1 ￿ H(p))
￿￿





￿ + ￿ + ￿1 ￿ H(p0) + ￿1h(p0)p0
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separating the integral in a convenient way and noting that:
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(￿ + ￿ + ￿1 ￿ H(p))￿
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rearranging I get the wage equation as a function of individual skill ("),
friction patterns (￿ and ￿1) and ￿rm￿ s productivity (p).









44Now I show that pmin is independent of ": pmin is the minimum observed
productivity level. Firms with productivity pmin make zero pro￿t, and there-
fore the whole productivity goes to the worker, who receive "pmin this wage




















Using the surplus splitting rule (3):






(￿ + ￿ + ￿ ￿ F(w(p0;")j"))
dF(W(p
0;"))
This is the value function for a worker of a given ", therefore we can rearrange
everything in terms of p:






(￿ + ￿ + ￿ ￿ H(p0))
dH(p
0)
using equation (4) and rearranging:










￿ + ￿ + ￿1 ￿ H(e p)
￿￿￿ de p
(￿ + ￿ + ￿ ￿ H(p0))(1￿￿) dH(p
0))
" becomes irrelevant:






￿ + ￿ + ￿1 ￿ H(e p)
￿￿￿ de p
(￿ + ￿ + ￿ ￿ H(p0))(1￿￿) dH(p
0)) ￿
45Note that pmin is a function of the distribution of p and the parameters
of the model. The intuition, in discrete time, is clear because the value of
being employed and the value of being unemployed are in￿nite additions of
￿ ows which are linear on " (w(";p) and b"): Each ￿ ow is multiplied by the
discount rate and the probability of being in each state, that do not depend on
": Hence the value of being employed and the value of being unemployed are
both linear in ": This condition must hold in order to avoid sorting between
p and ":
A.2 Duration model - Maximum Likelihood Speci￿ca-
tion
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Changing the variable within the integral, x =
￿
￿ + ￿1 ￿ H(p)
￿
t: After









x dx is the exponential integral function ￿.
My sample covers a ￿xed number of periods, so that some job durations
are right censored, and other job spells started before the panel￿ s beginning.
Then, the exact likelihood function that takes into account these events is:











46where ci is a truncated spell indicator and Hi is the time period elapsed
before the sample.
l(ti) = (1 ￿ ci)log
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(see Abramowitz and Stegun, 1972), and noting that E1(￿1) = 0
Z 1
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The same is true for
R 1
Hi L(t)dt. Then the likelihood takes the following
form:



































A.3 Robustness Check 1: Production Function
The robustness of the productivity estimates are crucial to be able to reach
reliable conclusions about wage discrimination. As robustness a check, I
present results of the productivity estimates under di⁄erent sets of assump-
tions.
No Frictions in the Capital Market: As it has been assumed in the the-
ory, the labor input is given for the ￿rm because it has not control over
job-creation and job-destruction Poisson processes but capital is chosen to
maximize pro￿t. Assuming that there are no frictions or adjustment cost in
the capital market, when a ￿rm knows the total labor Ljt it will have in the








Substituting the ￿rst order condition into the production function and















where rt is the cost of capital. Note that this production function is equivalent
to p", the production function assumed in the theory, where p is time and


















jt ) + ujt (18)
48In Table 11, I report within-groups non linear least squares estimates of
(8) and (18). Relative productivity estimates (ie: ￿w and ￿u) are very similar
in both estimations, di⁄erences between parameters are always smaller than
a standard deviation. This robustness check is essential because in this kind
of model, it is assumed that capital adjusts instantaneously to match the
number of workers in each period. Although this assumption may seem
controversial, it turns out that using observed capital or using the theoretical
optimal choice of capital does not change the relative productivity estimates.
Table 11: Production Function: Optimal Capital Input
WG-NLLS of (8) WG-NLLS of (18)
￿w ￿u ￿w ￿u
Manufacturing 0.672 0.484 0.642 0.478
(0.062) (0.042) (0.132) (0.070)
Construction 0.701 0.444 0.839 0.485
(0.052) (0.039) (0.141) (0.833)
Trade 0.804 0.487 0.745 0.541
(0.092) (0.056) (0.176) (0.982)
Services 0.588 0.298 0.595 0.301
(0.068) (0.030) (0.115) (0.040)
Note: Time dummies included. Robust to heteroskedasticity Standard errors are
given in parentheses.
Worker Composition Endogeneity: One of the main criticisms to the pro-
ductivity estimates reported in Hellerstein and Neumark (1999) and in Heller-
stein, Neumark, and Troske (1999) was that the proportion of women in the
￿rm is likely to be correlated with the ￿rm￿ s technology57.











jt ) + ujt
Note that (19) is the original Cobb-Douglas production function in logs
without imposing constant returns to scale and including the depreciated
57See Altonji and Blank (1999).
49Table 12: Production Function: Non Linear Least Squares in Levels
NLLS of (19)
￿k ￿l ￿w ￿u
Manufacturing 0.153 0.905 0.352 0.300
(0.007) (0.018) (0.032) (0.016)
Construction 0.084 1.034 0.451 0.382
(0.017) (0.028) (0.082) (0.043)
Trade 0.110 0.963 0.562 0.365
(0.018) (0.029) (0.068) (0.039)
Services 0.180 0.839 0.356 0.292
(0.098) (0.015) (0.029) (0.017)
Note: Time dummies included. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
capital instead of the optimal capital input. In this estimation I am assuming
that the depreciation rate is constant, and hence depreciated capital is a
constant fraction of the total capital.
The results are presented in Table 12. Female productivity estimates are
signi￿cantly smaller. This ￿nding is true for all sectors. Comparing these
results with results presented in Table (4), where ￿rm￿ s ￿xed e⁄ects were
removed, con￿rms the Altonji & Blank (1999) suspicion about correlation
between the women proportion and the ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ect. Hausman tests
reject equality of ￿w in every sector. In terms of ￿u; the results are not so
di⁄erent and I only reject equality for manufacturing.
Predetermined inputs:
Estimating (8) the ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ect is completely removed, but the si-
multaneity problem is not totally solved. One alternative would be to treat
Ljt and kjt as predetermined variables. In Table 13 I report System-GMM
estimates of (19). However the precision in the ￿0s GMM estimates is poor.
Capital coe¢ cients are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero and constant re-
turns to scale are not rejected in any sector. Sargan tests do not reject
compatibility of instruments in any sector. Haussman test of equality be-
tween ￿0s reported in Table 13 and those in Table 4 do not reject equality in
any group.
50Table 13: Production Function: Non Linear SYSTEM-GMM
System-GMM of (19)
￿k ￿l ￿w ￿u Sargan p-v
Manufacturing 0.060 0.938 0.70 0.15 58%
(0.046) (0.011) (0.454) (0.069)
Construction 0.016 1.164 0.442 0.188 98%
(0.043) (0.160) (0.267) (0.083)
Trade 0.053 1.003 0.370 0.322 97%
(0.050) (0.170) (0.290) (0.215)
Services 0.117 0.786 0.434 0.204 93%
(0.071) (0.146) (0.158) (0.090)
Note: Time dummies included. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
A.4 Robustness Check 2: Constructing ￿rm￿ s produc-
tivity
The productivity of ￿rm j in time t, is constructed with the parameters ob-
tained in Section 4.1. Although the production function was estimated using
output, productivity is constructed using value-added which is conceptually
more accurate.
There are two possibilities to construct marginal productivity measures:
￿ To include the residual term in the production function:







￿ To ignore this residual term:




For simplicity and following Cahuc et al (2006), I choose the ￿rst option.
In this case the productivity is simply pjt = ￿lYjt=Ljt: Whether ￿rms insure
temporary shocks to workers, is an open debate in the literature (see Guiso,
51Table 14: Robustness Check: Productivity
Women Men
With eujt Without eujt With eujt Without eujt
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
M Unsk. 0.419 0.438 0.398 0.551
(0.129) (0.096)
Sk. 0.226 0.134 0.292 0.245
(0.088) (0.046)
C Unsk. 0.214 0.195 0.408 0.407
(0.090) (0.045)
Sk. 0.113 0.109 0.186 0.286
(0.078) (0.104)
T Unsk. 0.339 0.326 0.382 0.435
(0.173) (0.106)
Sk. 0.152 0.135 0.222 0.194
(0.066) (0.064)
S Unsk. 0.849 0.794 0.757 0.686
(0.125) (0.125)
Sk. 0.413 0.423 0.324 0.402
(0.104) (0.073)
Note: Bootstrap Standard errors in parentheses for the model with eujt
Pistaferri and Schivardi, 2005). If ￿rms totally insure temporary shocks to
workers, and wages are determined as a function of the expected marginal
productivity, e pjt would be the relevant measure. If not, ￿ pjt would be the
correct one. In Table 14 I show that estimated ￿ with or without including
the residual term are very similar. Results with eujt (ie: using ￿ pjt) are the
same estimates reported in Table 6
A.5 Robustness Check 3: Allowing for Between Firms
Bertrand Competition
In the model presented in Section 2, workers do not have the option of re-
calling old employers. In this Subsection I estimate the model allowing re-
calling and Bertrand competition between ￿rms as in Cahuc, Postel-Vinay
52Table 15: Robustness Check: Allowing for Renegotiation
Women Men
￿CPR ￿CPR
Manufacturing Unskilled 0.212 0.182
Skilled 0.163 0.172
Construction Unskilled 0.223 0.289
Skilled 0.182 0.206
Trade Unskilled 0.238 0.254
Skilled 0.203 0.215
Services Unskilled 0.325 0.341
Skilled 0.241 0.231
Note: ￿CPR is the Nash bargaining power of the worker in the model with
renegotiation proposed in Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006). ￿CPR are
recovered by simulated method of moments.
and Robin (2006). ￿ has a di⁄erent interpretation in this model, it is still a
surplus-splitting parameter where the surplus has been de￿ned in terms of a
time varying outside option given by a poaching ￿rm58.
The estimated bargaining power are smaller than in the model without
Bertrand competition, now the weighted average is 21.8%. I ￿nd similar
patterns in terms of gender, than in the model without renegotiation. Women
are found to have smaller bargaining power than men in most of the groups.
As in the model proposed in this paper, female workers are only found to
have larger ￿ in services and in manufacturing but only in low quali￿cation
occupations.
Workers in low quali￿cation occupation are found to have higher bar-
gaining power than workers in high quali￿cation occupation. This results
have been found also estimating the model without renegotiation but it is
di⁄erent to what has been found by Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006),
estimating a similar model with French data.
The counterfactual decomposition works in the same way as the decom-
position described in Section 5. I ￿rst calculate the mean wages of female
58For the exact formulation of the bargaining scenario and a discussion on its implication
see Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006).
53workers, as a function of female wage determinants, and I sequentially change
each parameter until reaching the male mean wages.
Table 16: Gender Wage-Gap decomposition
.
Model with Bertrand Competition
Differences in Unskilled Skilled All
￿ 19.9 19.5 19.7
￿ -12.7 -7.1 -9.4
￿ 91.9 77.9 83.5
￿ 0.1 9.7 6.2
The decomposition is similar to the one that comes out from the model
without Bertrand Competition. Now 6.2 % of the wage gap is explained by
di⁄erences in the bargaining power, slightly less than before. Female workers
in high quali￿cation occupations are su⁄ering more wage discrimination. Dif-
ferences in productivity are responsible for most of the wage gap. Allowing
for Bertrand competition also increases the e⁄ect of di⁄erences in destruction
rates, decreases the e⁄ect of di⁄erences in job-o⁄ers arrival rates, and the net
e⁄ect of friction is now more important.
Details of the simulations:
The model used for simulations is a simpli￿ed version of the Cahuc,
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006) model, where the worker heterogeneity has
been omitted59.
￿ ￿CPR are recovered by the simulated method of moments.
￿ Simulations use the punctual estimates of ￿1; ￿; ￿w; ￿u and ￿l for every
sector and worker group, reported in Section 3.
￿ I assume that the primitive distribution of ￿rm￿ s productivity is log-
normal.
59Given that I am matching means, and the wage equation is linear in worker ability,
worker heterogenity does not play any role in these simulations.
MATA codes for simulating the model previuosly described are available from the author
upon request.
54￿ 32 moments have been matched
￿The mean-wages of female and male workers in each occupation
group and in each sector.
￿The mean-productivity of the endogenously truncated distribution
of ￿rms faced by female and male workers in each occupation
group and in each sector.
￿ Using condition (5), the unemployment rate of each group reported
in EUROSTAT60 and the estimates of ￿ for each group, I recover an
estimate of ￿0 for female and male workers in each occupation group
and in each sector.
A.6 Detecting Discrimination - Traditional Approach
In order to compare di⁄erent strategies to detect wage discrimination. I
perform the traditional approach using Mincer-type wage equations. As it
can be seen in Table 17, women have large wage di⁄erentials. Controlling for
observable characteristics, they receive wages, on average, 21 percent lower
than men. This di⁄erence is signi￿cant and consistent with what has been
found in previous research: Blau and Kahn (2000), with OECD data reports
a di⁄erence of 25.5 percent between male and female mean wages, while
Fitzenberger and Wunderlich (2002) with the same data as in this paper,
but using quantile regression, the estimated German gender wage gap ranges
between 16 percent and 25 percent depending on job￿ s quali￿cation.
Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition
Using the results presented in Table 17, I calculate a Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition, which is basically to decompose the wage-gap between dif-
ferences in observable and unobservable characteristics. The counterfactual
female mean-wage has to be interpreted as the mean-wage that women would
have if they had the male distribution of observable characteristics. There-
fore, the di⁄erence between the counterfactual female mean-wage and the
60The mean unemployment rate between 1996 and 2005 was 9.64 percent for females
and 9.11 percent for males (see EUROSTAT).
55Table 17: Mincer Wage Equations - Censored-Normal Regression. Maximum
Likelihood Estimates
y=Log(wage) All Men Women
Women -0.211 - -
(0.0004) - -
Immigrant 0.073 0.061 0.076
(0.0006) (0.0016) (0.0006)
skilled 0.255 0.178 0.276
(0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0005)
age 0.056 0.068 0.054
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002)
age2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Primary Education 0.236 0.257 0.234
(0.0004) (0.0011) (0.0005)
College -0.127 -0.082 -0.162
(incomplete) (0.0014) (0.0028) (0.0015)
Technical College 0.386 0.436 0.354
(completed) (0.0010) (0.0021) (0.0012)
College 0.609 0.616 0.566
(0.0011) (0.0033) (0.0011)
University Degree 0.757 0.819 0.700
(0.0011) (0.0027) (0.0012)
tenure 0.017 0.025 0.015
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
experience 0.033 0.021 0.036
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001)
Part-Time -0.638 -0.651 -0.608
(0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0011)
Manufacturing 0.178 0.175 0.103
(0.0008) (0.0016) (0.0010)
Construction 0.063 0.026 -0.081
(0.0013) (0.0029) (0.0014)
Services 0.037 0.025 -0.023
(0.0009) (0.0017) (0.0011)
Constant 2.500 2.189 2.599
(0.0029) (0.0066) (0.0031)
Pseudo R2 47.23 30.92 52.53
Sigma 0.38 0.48 0.34
Note: Std. errors are given in parentheses. Time Dummies included.
56observed women mean-wage is the portion of the gap understood as discrim-
ination.
Following this approach, I would conclude that women are being discrim-
inated. They are receiving wages which are on average almost 15 percent
lower than wages of similar men in terms of observable characteristics. These
results are slightly di⁄erent to those obtained in this paper what might be
suggesting that, in this case, the traditional approach is not able to disen-
tangle di⁄erences in unobserved characteristics from discrimination.
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